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so holding, the court cites Professor Siegel's practice commentary
wherein this procedure is recommended. 99
Although this court's adoption of Professor Siegel's suggested
procedure is merely dictum, 10 0 if this suggestion is followed it will,
in effect, amount to a short adjournment by the court to allow the defendant his statutorily guaranteed twenty day notice. However, the
adjournment has the advantage of permitting the court to retain personal jurisdiction over the parties.
Retention of personal jurisdiction can become exceedingly acute
when there is also a statute of limitations problem or a possible problem
in regaining personal jurisdiction over the defendant. For example,
where the statute of limitations has tolled during the period between
the service of the summons and the return date of the motion, a
concededly remote possibility, the plaintiff's attorney might be guilty
of malpractice through no real fault of his own. The other possible
injustice which might otherwise arise is where the personal jurisdiction
of the defendant is permanently lost to the plaintiff upon dismissal of
the action. In all other cases the plaintiff can begin his suit anew by
serving another summons and motion for summary judgment under
CPLR 3213 and hoping for a more fortuitous service.
The result suggested in both the instant case and by Professor
Siegel would further the legislative intent underlying the enactment
of 3213 and should be adopted to alleviate the two problems discussed.
In this manner, defendant gets the twenty days to answer to which he
is entitled, and plaintiff is not out of court merely because the process
server he used was unable to serve the papers on the exact date contemplated.
CPLR 3213: Separation agreement held not to be an instrument for
the payment of money only.
A motion for summary judgment in lieu of a complaint is warranted under CPLR 3213 when an action is presumptively meritorious, i.e., when it "is based upon an instrument for the payment of
money only or upon any judgment .... "
The predecessors of the CPLR did not offer a plaintiff similar
summary relief. Therefore, little New York statutory or case law
precedent existed to aid in the section's interpretation after its enact99 7B AMcKINNEY'S CPLR 3213, supp. commentary 286-88 (1965).
100 The court found that defendants had waived the right to object to the lack of
the twenty-day notice of motion because they served answering affidavits and elected to
contest on the merits.
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ment. 1' 1 Additionally, legislative documents do not go far in amplifying
the intent behind the use of the phrase "instrument for the payment
of money only."' 1 2 The judiciary therefore has been unable to clearly
define exactly what instruments will meet the statutory test, and this
is particulary true when proof of the claim may rest upon extrinsic
facts or when the instrument may contain additional obligations beyond the one calling for the payment of money. Lacking strong appellate authority to the contrary, the lower courts tend to construe the
section rather liberally on occasion. 0 3 However, two recent appellate
decisions0 4 and one recent district court decision 0 5 afford more conservative guidelines which may make future determinations of this
nature easier to arrive at.
In Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Machine Corp.,1 6 the first
department, reversing an order of the special term, held that a promissory note came within the purview of the statute in spite of defendant's
allegations that the note arose from a transaction embracing other
features which it had been fraudulently induced to enter. The appellate division dismissed these assertions, arguing that they were precluded by a disclaimer clause in the contract between the parties or, in
the alternative, that they were without substance. Moreover, the court
expressed the view that CPLR 3213 was not limited in its application
to notes to which defendant fails to assert a defense based upon extrinsic facts. "Even despite such issues, the note itself requires the
' 107
defendants to make certain payments and nothing else."
All-O-Matic Manufacturing Corp. v. Shields,'10

8

decided by the

District Court of Nassau County, expressly adopted the Seaman-Andwall reasoning and concluded that a chattel mortgage for the sale and
01 Two early New York cases have, however, construed the words "instrument for
the payment of money only." See Kratzenstein v. Lehman, 19 App. Div. 228, 230, 46 N.Y.S.
71, 72 (Ist Dep't 1897); Adler v. Bloomingdale, 8 N.Y. Super. Ct. (1 Duer) 601 (1852).
102 See FIRsT REP. 91; FiFr REP. 492; SIXTH REP. 338.
103 See, eg., Mike Nasti Sand Co. v. Almar Landscaping Corp., 57 Misc. 2d 550, 293
N.Y.S.2d 220 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968); Baker v. Gundermann, 52 Misc. 2d 639, 276
N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966); Orenstein v. Orenstein, 58 Misc. 2d 377. 295
N.Y.S.2d 116 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1968), rev'd, 59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App.
T. 2d Dep't 1969). See also, The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JOHN's L.
Rav. 686, 696 (1969); The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN's L. REv.
283, 302, 303 (1967).
104 Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 295 N.Y.S.2d
752 (Ist Dep't 1968); Orenstein v. Orenstein, 59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. T.
2d Dep't 1969).
105 AlI-O-Matic Mfg. Corp. v. Shields, 59 Misc. 2d 199, 298 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1969).
106 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 295 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1st Dep't 1968).
107 Id. at 137, 295 N.Y.S.2d at 754 (emphasis added).
108 59 Misc. 2d 199, 298 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969).
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financing of an automobile was not within the purview of 3213. However, the importance of the case lies not in this holding, but in its examination of earlier decisions which denied the motion under CPLR
3213.101 This enabled the court to isolate the characteristic common
to all the instruments unsuccessfully sued upon in those cases - "[they]
called for something in addition to the payment of money.""10 In light
of these decisions, the All-O-Matic court adopted the principle that
summary judgment is the proper remedy only when an instrument requires the payment of money and "nothing else."
Finally, and most recently, the second department unanimously
reversed an order granting a motion made pursuant to 3213 in Orenstein v. Orenstein."1 In so doing, the court held that an action to recover payments pursuant to a separation agreement was not an action
based upon an instrument for the payment of money only, even though
the terms of the agreement were absolute, specific and unconditional.
The decision illustrates the wisdom of the All-O-Matic pronouncement
and serves to further indicate some of the considerations which a court
should weigh before it summarily disposes of a defendant's objections
to a cause of action which may only appear presumptively meritorious.
An action to recover payments due pursuant to a separation agreement is not an action on an instrument for the payment of a sum of
money only because there are often other issues arising from the underlying contractual agreement that must be adjudicated. Typically, a
separation agreement spells out the many and varied obligations of
the parties over and above the payment of money. Moreover, there
are many obligations imposed upon a husband and wife by law which
are impliedly incorporated into such an agreement. It therefore would
seem that a separation agreement could never be a proper "instrument"
upon which to base a motion under CPLR 3213.
The foregoing cases will most likely cause lower courts to carefully examine all the aspects of an instrument before relief is granted
under 3213. And, quite predictably, where doubts exist as to the effect
of extrinsic facts or secondary obligations, express or implied, other109 See Signal Plan v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 23 App. Div. 2d 636, 256 N.Y.S.2d 866
(1st Dep't 1965); Guele v. Scaiano, 56 Misc. 2d 1040, 290 N.Y.S.2d 950 (App. T. 2d Dep't
1968); Burnell v. People Say. Bank, 54 Misc. 2d 140, 281 N.Y.S.2d 960 (App. T.
2d Dep't 1967); Vanni v. Long Island City Say. & Loan Ass'n, 53 Misc. 2d 453, 278 N.Y.S.2d
988 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1967); Embassy Indus., Inc. v. SML Corp., 45 Misc. 2d 91, 256
N.YS.2d 214 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1964); Lopez v. Perry, 53 Misc. 2d 445, 278 N.Y.S.2d 947
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1967); Baker v. Gundermann, 52 Misc. 2d 639, 276 N.Y.S.2d 495
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966).
110 59 Misc. 2d at 200, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
11159 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 648 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1969), rev'g 58 Misc. 2d 377,
295 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Civ. Ct. Queens County 1968).
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wise proper motions may be denied. However, due to the nature of
the section, such doubts are properly resolved in favor of the defendant.
The extra expenses incurred when a plaintiff finds it necessary to serve
a complaint are minimal in comparison to the costs. of appealing from
summary determinations which may have failed to recognize all the
equities present.
ARTICLE
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CPLR 3402: Second department conditions restoration to calendar on
payment of money by plaintiff's attorney to defendant.
In Barradav. Target Construction Corp.,11 2 the Appellate Division, Second Department, reversed a supreme court order denying
plaintiff's motion to restore the case to the trial calendar (following
dismissal for failure to appear at a calendar call) on the condition that
plaintiff's attorney pay defendant two hundred and fifty dollars.
Since CPLR 3404 provides for automatic dismissal by the court
clerk of all cases abandoned for more than one year, it is apparent that
the instant case involved a timely motion to restore within the designated one year period although the facts do not so indicate.
The Barrada opinion appears to strike a balance between the
onerous consequences which would have flowed from dismissal, and
the harm to the defendant resulting from plaintiff's default. If the
lower court decision had been allowed to stand, the plaintiff's attorney
might have been found guilty of malpractice, and therefore liable for
all the associated consequences; whereas, by allowing the plaintiff's
attorney to pay the defendant two hundred and fifty dollars in lieu
of any expenses incurred as a result of the delay, both parties are placed
in nearly the same position they were in before dismissal, and both may
proceed with the litigation on the merits.
The court has thus placed the financial responsibility upon the
party presumably at fault-the attorney for the plaintiff. Of course,
a warning to all practitioners is in order. The reason plaintiff's attorney missed the calendar call is not stated and one must, accordingly,
presume that it was not for a frivolous purpose. The court, however,
indicates that the facts and circumstances must be weighed in each
particular case, and future cases may well arise wherein the court is
not so lenient with counsel.
112 31 App. Div. 2d 810, 299 N.Y.S.2d 708 (2d Dep't 1969).

